Academic freedom in Europe: time for a Magna Charta? by Karran, Terence
Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta? 
 
Terence Karran 
 
Centre for Educational Research and Development, University of Lincoln, Lincoln, LN6 7TS, 
U.K. 
Email: tkarran@lincoln.ac.uk 
 
[This is a post-peer-review, pre-copy edit version of an article to be published in Higher 
Education Policy in 2009.  The definitive publisher-authenticated version ‘Academic 
Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna Charta?’ Higher Education Policy (2009) Vol. 22, 
will be available online at: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/hep/index.html] 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper is a preliminary attempt to establish a working definition of academic 
freedom for the European Union states. The paper details why such a definition is required for 
the European Union and then examines some of the difficulties of defining academic freedom. 
By drawing upon experience of the legal difficulties beset by the concept in the USA and 
building on previous analyses of constitutional and legislative protection for academic 
freedom, and of legal regulations concerning institutional governance and academic tenure, a 
working definition of academic freedom is then derived. The resultant definition which, it is 
suggested, could form the basis for a European Magna Charta Libertatis Academicae, goes 
beyond traditional discussions of academic freedom by specifying not only the rights inherent 
in the concept but also its accompanying duties, necessary limitations and safeguards. The 
paper concludes with proposals for how the definition might be tested and carried forward. 
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Introduction 
This paper’s purpose is to provide a working definition of academic freedom for the higher 
education institutions of the European Union. The paper’s rationale is as follows. Firstly, 
academic freedom is considered a fundamental aspect of the workings of Universities in the 
European Union. For example, the Magna Charta Universitatum declaims: ‘Freedom in 
research and training is the fundamental principle of university life, and governments and 
universities, each as far as in them lies, must ensure respect for this fundamental requirement’ 
(EUA, 1988, 1).  Similarly, the proposed European Union Constitution explicitly states in 
Article II-73 that ‘[t]he arts and scientific research shall be free of constraint. Academic 
freedom shall be respected’ (E.U., 2005, 50). The Constitution received insufficient support 
among the E.U. nations to be enacted into law. However, if the process of integration among 
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the 27 (and more) member states is to proceed, a document of similar status is likely to be 
ratified within the next decade. For such a document to have a meaningful impact in ensuring 
that academic freedom is nurtured and protected, academic freedom needs to be defined. 
Therefore a second rationale is that it is difficult to argue coherently for the importance of 
academic freedom when it is ill-defined. Hence Jasper (1990, 451) states ‘[o]ne of the primary 
reasons for the difficulty in protecting academic freedom is that the academic community has 
agreed upon no single definition of the term’. Similarly, as Felt (2002, 15) has recognised, 
‘[e]ven though we would very quickly agree on the importance of “academic freedom” for the 
development of contemporary societies, the meaning of this notion remains extremely vague’, 
and even when academic freedom is discussed, as Gerber (2001, 23) relates, ‘[t]oo often, 
however, references to academic freedom in public discourse are formulaic or disingenuous 
and fail to take in to account the full meaning of the concept’. Hence, because of its presumed 
importance, Altbach (2001, 217) argues that ‘[a]cademic freedom needs a universal definition 
. . . (as) the lack of agreement on the nature of academic freedom makes a common 
understanding and unified action difficult’. 
The final rationale is that Karran’s (2007) analysis of the legal protection for academic 
freedom within the E.U. nations revealed sufficient commonalities to demonstrate that a 
unified definition is possible, but indicated that the level of academic freedom in some states 
was markedly lower than in others. For the process of integration among the European Union 
states to proceed, it is necessary to assess the comparative differences between the nations, 
and previous empirical research has identified these dissimilarities with respect to academic 
freedom. Once this is done, benchmarks can be established based on best and most common 
practice – for example, under Austrian law no member of a university can be required to 
participate in academic work which conflicts with his/her conscience, and such legislation 
would produce net benefits for academic freedom if applied across Europe. From such 
benchmarks appropriate policy mechanisms can be developed, which allocate suitable 
resources to the individual nations in accordance with the comparative differences identified, 
to enable all states to reach a similar level of provision. Hence a working definition of 
academic freedom for the E.U. is an essential step in the development of such policy 
instruments, to facilitate greater integration of the higher education systems of the European 
Union nations and the creation of the European Higher Education Learning Space. 
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What is Academic Freedom? 
Not surprisingly, academics agree that ‘[a]cademic freedom is of unquestioned importance’ 
(Stuller, 1998, 342). For example, Turner (1988, 107) considers that ‘[a]cademic freedom is 
not therefore some arcane and anachronistic privilege. … It is the simple and basic condition 
for the job’. Similarly Menand (1996, 4) states that academic freedom ‘is the key legitimating 
concept of the entire enterprise’. In consequence of this interest, as Cameron (1996, 1) has 
noted, ‘[t]he literature on academic freedom is voluminous’. For example, the bibliographic 
analysis by Sinder (1990) that lists over 170 articles, many of which seek definitional clarity 
because ‘[b]efore one can defend academic freedom, however, it must be defined’ (Rajagopal, 
2003, 25). Given such academic industriousness, Åkerlind and Kayrooz’s (2003, 328) opinion 
that, ‘[d]espite the wide ranging debate about academic freedom in recent times, there is little 
consensus between parties as to what academic freedom actually means. … the concept is 
open to a range of interpretations and has been used at times to support conflicting causes and 
positions’, is therefore surprising. However this view is widely shared. For example, from 
Benson’s perspective ‘[a] precise definition of academic freedom has yet to be articulated’ 
(Benson, 1983, 679), while according to Olivas (1992, 1835) ‘[a]cademic freedom …is poorly 
understood and ill-defined’, an opinion shared by Neave (2002, 332), who reports that ‘a 
single interpretation of Academic Freedom is very far from being shared’. 
Hence ‘[a]cademic freedom seems a simple concept, and in essence it is, but it is also 
difficult to define’ (Altbach, 2001, 206) and ‘[t]he term is certainly not a self-defining one 
and can also be a source of considerable contention and even litigation’ (Schmeltekoph, 2000, 
1). Some of this contention is due to the predilection for argumentation among academics 
(especially when considering a principle crucial to their profession), some of whom believe 
that attempts to define academic freedom may be ill-judged. For example, Scott (1996, 177) 
suggests that ‘[a]cademic freedom can never be boiled down to an essence: it is instead an 
ethical practice aimed not at the protection of individuals, but at the advancement of our 
collective well-being’. Similarly, Tierney (2001, 12) describes academic life as ‘nuanced and 
complex (such that) one ought not to define academic freedom solely by the presence or 
absence of overt interference’. Further, Menand (1996, 5) refers to the ‘more deeply 
misleading assumption … that there exists some unproblematic conception of academic 
freedom that is philosophically coherent and that will conduce to outcomes in particular cases 
which all parties will feel to be just and equitable’. 
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Part of the problem lies in the fact that, as Russell (1993, 1) relates, ‘[t]he words 
“academic freedom” have often caused confusion because they come from a medieval 
intellectual tradition which pre-dates most of the current meanings of the word “freedom”’. 
However, academics have a vested interest in resisting definitional clarity, as when the limits 
of academic freedom are imprecise it is more difficult for those accused of infringing 
academic freedom to demonstrate their innocence. As Schmitt (1975, 113) points out, the 
academic freedom campaign was very successful because ‘politicians have become very wary 
of being labelled enemies of freedom for attacking academics. . . . The confusions 
surrounding the concept of academic freedom . . . have been extremely helpful in this 
campaign’. Moreover, Manan (2000, 255) argues, ‘there are professors who used academic 
freedom as a weapon to defend themselves from their performance being evaluated by the 
academic community’. Indeed, the degree of elasticity applied to the principle by academics 
has been inventive, if unpersuasive – Rabban (1987, 1410), for example, reports that while he 
was the AAUP’s legal counsel ‘several professors of medicine asserted that universities had 
violated their academic freedom by limiting their clinical income to 100,000 dollars’. 
One of the major problems with academic freedom is that, as Van Alstyne (1975, 71) 
notes, ‘[a]cademic freedom is a “freedom” (i.e., a liberty marked by the absence of restraints 
or threats against its exercise) rather than a “right” (i.e., an enforceable claim upon the assets 
of others)’. Consequently, ‘[a]cademic freedom is most often defined by a violation or an 
abridgment of a particular right. In other words, academic freedom is often defined by its 
absence’ (Tierney, 2001, 8). Hence, academics in the United States have resorted to legal 
redress when their academic freedom has been violated.  Although the US Supreme Court has 
upheld the right of academic freedom, Byrne (1989, 257) notes that it ‘has been far more 
generous in its praise of academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its 
meaning’, such that Lynch (2003, 1066) argues ‘[a]lthough many courts and commentators 
simply refer to “academic freedom”, proper analysis requires further specification of what 
type of academic freedom is being referenced’. 
However US legal rulings have not attempted to define academic freedom, but instead 
pass opinion on whether it has been infringed. Consequently, as Byrne (1989, 253) 
graphically describes, ‘[l]acking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in law, 
picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles’. Hence Byrne (2001, 583) argues that academic 
freedom ‘lacks a canonical definition. It primarily is a creation of academics themselves in 
articulating the normative basis of modern scholarship and teaching. Only derivatively is 
academic freedom a legal concept.’ Most analyses of academic freedom in America relate to 
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its protection under the free speech amendments of the US Constitution. Unlike the US 
Constitution, the proposed European Union constitution categorically states that ‘[a]cademic 
freedom shall be respected’ (E.U., 2005, 50), but provides no further guidance, suggesting 
that if the constitution was adopted in this form, the legal wrangles over the definition of 
academic freedom, evident in the USA, could occur in Europe. 
As Goldstein (1976, 1293) states, ‘the modern development of the doctrine of academic 
freedom is largely derived from the nineteenth century German concepts of Lehrfreiheit and 
Lernfreiheit’ which are associated with the reforms instituted by Wilhelm von Humboldt at 
Berlin University. Ash’s analysis (2006) challenges the centrality of Humboldt’s contribution 
which, he argues, has acquired a mythical status at variance with historical fact. However, as 
Nybom (2003, pp.144,141) points out, although ‘[t]he intellectual core and institutional 
rational of the Humboldtian university concept rested on … ideological building blocks which 
were …integral dimensions of German idealistic philosophy, and, consequently, not Wilhelm 
von Humboldt’s own original intellectual inventions,’ nevertheless the Humboldtian ideal 
needs to be addressed because of ‘its continued presence in almost every European discussion 
on the mission and future of higher education and research’. Moreover, the Humboldtian 
model had an equally profound impact in the USA. In 1876, Johns Hopkins was founded as 
the first American university offering graduate education on the German model. As White 
(2000, 59) reports: ‘[o]f the fifty-three Hopkins faculty members when the university was first 
established, nearly all had studied at German universities. They adopted the German method 
of instruction, relying on lectures, seminars, and laboratories’. Such was the German 
influence on Hopkins that, as Hofstadter and Metzger (1955, 377) note: ‘[a]ptly was this 
university called the Göttingen at Baltimore’, and Johns Hopkins became the model for the 
modern American research university. 
A central aspect of the Humboldtian model was the unity of teaching and research, 
(Einheit von Lehre und Forschung) and the collaborative pursuit of these by staff and 
students. Hence Von Humboldt (1970, 242f) considered that universities have ‘as their task 
the cultivation of science and scholarship in the deepest and broadest sense,’ in which 
‘[c]ollaboration operates through a process in which the successful intellectual achievements 
of one person arouse the intellectual passions and enthusiasms of others, and through the fact 
that what was at first expressed only by one individual becomes a common intellectual 
possession instead of fading away in isolation.’ In this process ‘both teacher and student have 
their justification in the common pursuit of knowledge’ and hence ‘the goals of science and 
scholarship are worked towards most effectively through the synthesis of the teacher's and the 
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students' dispositions’. Hence as Lay (2004, 48) observes ‘[t]eaching was to be a means of 
improving both lecturer and student: true knowledge would emerge in the interplay between 
experience and enthusiasm’. 
The Humboldtian model of academic freedom, still resonates, albeit muted, within the 
universities of the European Union. Thus, in 1988 430 University Rectors signed the Magna 
Charta Universitatum, which proclaimed adherence to the Humboldtian principle that 
‘[t]eaching and research in universities must be inseparable’ (EUA, 1998, 1). Despite 
acknowledging the importance of academic freedom, the Magna Charta Observatory has yet 
to provide a workable definition of the concept. Work by the International Universities 
Association led to a ‘Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching 
Personnel’, which was adopted by UNESCO in 1997. The UNESCO (1997) document is 
comprehensive but has limited utility as the basis for a Magna Charta Libertatis Academicae, 
or in determining the day to day applicability or repudiation of academic freedom. 
Academic Freedom: A Working Definition for the European Union 
There is a danger that any definition will be developed as a lowest common denominator, and 
cast broad enough to encompass the majority of existing practices in E.U. states. However, for 
academic freedom to possess more than mere ornamental significance in Europe’s 
Universities, ‘the particulars of the concept of academic freedom must be carefully defined; it 
is not a liberty arbitrarily granted’ (Rochford, 2003, 250). However, one must acknowledge 
that minor variations in university teaching and research occur within and between 
universities and nation states, which may impact on academic freedom.  For example, the 
dominant university model in Europe is the state funded secular institution but there are both 
religious and private (non-denominational) universities in the E.U., which operate in a slightly 
different fashion.  In Spain, for example, both private non-denominational and 
denominational universities exist, however, as Embid (1999, 100) explains all ‘Private 
University recognition Acts refer to the need for a University’s organizational and functional 
rules to “respect and guarantee, fully and effectively, the principle of educational freedom 
which is shown in academic freedom, freedom of research and freedom of study.”’  
Despite such minor exceptions, the longevity of universities and the universality of their 
structures, (Faculties, Departments), practices (lectures, seminars, theses, etc.) and personnel 
(Rectors, Professors, Lecturers) are such that a definition of academic freedom (and more 
significantly, its limitations) should be possible. Moreover, with some justification, Barnett 
(1990, 137) has argued that: ‘[t]he traditional discussions of academic freedom, … are also 
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depressingly uniform. They frequently exhibit the following characteristics: a lack of 
specificity; a concern for the academic freedom of staff not students; a defensive proclamation 
of the rights of academics; and a disinclination to say anything about the duties that should 
accompany academics' rights’. Hence in attempting a definition, rather than trying to find a 
conclusive epistemological needle in a philosophical haystack, the concern is to provide a 
preliminary generic statement that is sharp enough with which to sew together the essential 
elements of the concept, and make them readily explicable, thereby addressing the 
deficiencies identified by Barnett. Therefore the following is offered as a preliminary 
foundation for this definitional process, and a stimulus to debate 
The literature on academic freedom concentrates on extolling its desirability, and not 
defining its limits or accompanying duties. However, as Kennedy (2003, 2) points out: 
‘[a]cademic freedom has a counterpart, academic duty, that is much more seldom used’. 
Moreover, as Bollinger (2005, 20) points out: ‘[w]e should not accept the argument that our 
professional norms cannot be defined, and that transgressions thus must be accepted without 
consequences. … it will not do simply to say that professional standards are too vague for any 
enforcement’. Consequently, this paper tries to remedy this by clarifying these limits and 
duties in greater depth than previous analyses. Hence, as Machlup (1955, 753) states: ‘If 
freedom in general is defined as the absence of, or protection from, restraints and 
interferences, the definition of a particular kind of freedom will have to specify whose 
protection from whose interferences of what sort and with what kind of activity it refers to’. 
Some limitations on academic freedom derive from national legal frameworks, others from 
codes of conduct regarding professional duties, emanating from the weft and warp of 
academic life. Braxton and Bayer (1999), noting the dearth of empirical research into the 
norms of university staff, gathered data from circa 1000 respondents, working in a variety of 
institutions.  Seven norms were derived from this data which ‘are inviolable because of the 
extreme severity of the sanctions believed to fit transgressions of such norms’ (p. 21), more 
specifically, tenure removal. Braxton and Bayer accept that their list of norms is not 
exhaustive, but argue that, on the basis of their sample size, ‘the range of incidents . . . likely 
represent the full spectrum of improprieties that might be uncovered’ (op. cit, 15). 
Rabban (2001, 17) points out that academic freedom, has been used to denote ‘both the 
freedom of the academy to pursue its ends without interference from the government . . . and 
the freedom of the individual teacher (or in some versions - indeed in most cases - the 
student)’. Consequently Warnock (1992, 120) argues, it is necessary to distinguish ‘autonomy 
from academic freedom. . . . A great deal of confusion has been generated in recent years by a 
p.7 
failure to make this distinction’. Wolff’s study makes this distinction explicit viz. ‘[a]cademic 
freedom is the privilege individual academics may claim as the freedom to question and test 
received wisdom, to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without 
placing themselves in jeopardy of losing the jobs or privileges they may have at their 
institutions. Academic autonomy applies to the institution. It may be defined as the right of 
academic institutions to decide freely and independently how to perform their tasks’ (Wolff, 
2000, 198). Hence to avoid confusion, the following definition refers to freedom for 
individuals within the academy, rather than the freedom of the academy within society, to 
which the description academic freedom is oft-times applied, but which refers to institutional 
autonomy (for a fuller discussion, see Finkin 1983, and Hiers 2002). 
Similarly, freedom of speech and academic freedom need to be distinguished for, as 
Olivas (1993, 1838) rightly points out, ‘[t]he concepts of free speech and academic freedom 
are symmetrical and overlapping, not synonymous’.  In the majority of EU states, the 
distinction between freedom of speech and academic freedom is recognised in law, with the 
former being protected as a basic constitutional right, while the latter is given separate 
protection either elsewhere in the constitution or within specific legislation on higher 
education.  Hence this situation is different from that in the United States, where academic 
freedom is protected derivatively, rather than directly, under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution which protects freedom of speech.  Consequently, as Van Alsytne (1975, 62) 
notes  in the USA ‘the phrase (academic freedom) slipped away from a close association with 
protection of the academic in his professional endeavours and assumed a new synonymy with 
the general civil liberties of academics.’ However, academic freedom is more narrow in focus 
than freedom of speech and, moreover, unlike freedom of speech, is granted to the few rather 
than the many.  Freedom of speech is a generic activity freedom granted to all who speak and 
constitutes the absence of constraint on utterances performed for no particular purpose or 
effect. By contrast, academic freedom is a specific personal freedom granted only to those 
who ‘perform academic actions.  Academic actions are teaching, research and the publication 
of the results of research and reflection’ (Shils, 1995, 6), so that these actions can be 
successfully undertaken. 
Academic freedom is granted to academic (non-administrative) teaching and research 
staff in Universities to enable them to undertake their teaching and research activities to the 
highest possible professional standards. It comprises the following elements. 
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Teaching 
In undertaking their teaching, academic freedom is granted to individual academic staff to 
determine: 
(1) The subject curriculum and how it is taught. In exercising this freedom, staff must ensure 
that, as agreed by their academic peers and relevant academic associations and 
professional bodies, the subject content and the method of teaching: 
(A) are appropriate for, and relevant to, the subject and level (undergraduate, master, 
doctoral) at which the course is set and are therefore comparable with (but not 
necessarily identical to) the content and mode of instruction for similar qualifications 
at other comparable institutions, and are made known to the students prior to 
commencement of the course. Any deviations from the course, in respect to the 
content and method of tuition, must be made known to the students in good time, and 
the reasons for them reported fully; 
(B) accurately and impartially reflect current thinking, recent research and balanced 
opinion within their subject disciplines and are taught in a mode appropriate to their 
subject discipline; 
(C) are such that they do not introduce any element of positive or negative bias, 
distortion, misrepresentation or deliberate omission within the content and mode of 
delivery or make derogatory, stigmatising or irrelevant, oral or written statements (or 
nonverbal symbols) in respect to (inter alia) age, economic status, ethnicity, gender, 
language, marital status, nationality, personality, political belief, physical 
appearance, physical or mental disablement, race, religion, sexual orientation, social 
status, wealth, etc., unless these relate directly to the subject matter. For example, 
statements about government military policy would be impermissible during a 
geology lecture but gender studies’ courses might justifiably include the examination 
of derogatory statements made about men or women. However, statements about the 
physical appearance of a particular student or member of staff would never be 
acceptable. 
(2) Who shall be allowed to teach. In exercising this freedom, staff must ensure that: 
(A) persons employed to teach are appointed via an open, well documented and 
transparent selection process (as outlined in the section on tenure), solely on the basis 
of their teaching and research excellence, expertise and experience and are not 
subject to any discrimination on the basis of the factors identified in (1) (C). 
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(B) notwithstanding point (2) (A), where required by national or state legislation, 
academic staff may exercise affirmative action to secure employment from groups 
under-represented in university teaching positions, but this must be undertaken 
strictly in adherence with the relevant legislation and recorded as such. Such 
temporary measures must be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment are achieved. 
(3) Who shall be allowed to study. In exercising this freedom, staff must ensure that: 
(A) students are chosen solely on the basis of their academic abilities, via an open, well 
documented and transparent selection process, and without discrimination on the 
basis of any other irrelevant criteria [as identified in (1) (C), above]. 
(B) notwithstanding point (3) (A), where required by national or state legislation, 
academic staff may exercise affirmative action to secure entry for students from 
groups normally under-represented in higher education, but this must be undertaken 
strictly in adherence with the relevant legislation and recorded as such. Such 
temporary measures must be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment are achieved. 
(4) How students’ achievements shall be assessed and graded. In exercising this freedom, 
individually and collectively, academic staff must ensure that, as agreed by their 
academic peers and relevant academic associations and professional bodies: 
(A) the methods of assessment and of calculating grades are appropriate for the subject 
curriculum and level (undergraduate, master, doctoral) at which the course is set and 
are comparable with those used for similar qualifications at other comparable 
institutions, and are made known to the students at the commencement of the course. 
Any deviations to the assessment mode during the course, must be made known to 
the students in good time, and the reasons for them reported fully; 
(B) the assessment marks and grades awarded relate directly to the academic ability of 
students, as demonstrated via their performance of assessment tasks, and without 
reference to any other irrelevant criteria [as identified in (1) (C), above]. To avoid 
implicit or explicit bias in assessment and grading, the university should attempt to 
anonymise the assessment and grading processes and institute a system of double 
blind marking; 
(C) students are provided with concise and timely feedback on assessment performance 
and grades, which enables a full understanding of the rationale for the grade 
awarded; 
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(D) a national or institutional system of quality assurance exists whereby external 
examiners, qualified in the subject, can evaluate the assessment and grading systems 
to ensure that, in accordance with national and subject specific norms, they are 
appropriate, relevant, accurately, consistently and fairly applied, and free from bias; 
(E) institutional and external appeals systems exist, whereby students can seek a second 
opinion on a grade awarded, if they believe that the grade awarded does not 
accurately reflect the standard of their work, in respect to a specific assessment task. 
(5) Whether they are speaking in their capacity as a teacher or a citizen. Academic freedom 
is freedom of speech given for expert utterance within the university, in pursuit of 
teaching and research excellence. Hence, faculty staff engaging in extra-mural utterances 
are not protected by academic freedom, but enjoy all other constitutional and legal 
freedoms afforded to the population at large. Moreover, in making utterances as private 
citizens, faculty staff must make it explicit that they are neither speaking nor acting for 
their institutions. Similarly, utterances made on campus which are outside the academics’ 
stated areas of expertise (for example, their beliefs on religion or politics), or made 
outside a formal academic setting, are protected by generic rights of free speech, but not 
by academic freedom, and faculty making such utterances have a responsibility to 
distinguish when their objective is advocacy rather than academic excellence. 
Furthermore, on-campus utterances, undertaken by external invited speakers, as part of 
the process of formal scholarly debate, have the protection of academic freedom, and the 
right to be heard. 
Research 
In undertaking research, academic freedom is granted to academic staff to determine: 
(1) In which subject areas they focus their research efforts, and the research methods they 
adopt. In exercising these freedoms, staff must ensure that, as agreed by, their academic 
peers, relevant academic associations and professional bodies, and national and 
international governmental bodies: 
(A) their research does not contravene international and national laws, and institutional 
codes of ethical principles and practices, working conditions and regulations, specific 
to their academic discipline and the subject(s) chosen for research (for example the 
collection and use of human tissue in genetic research requires prior informed 
consent); 
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(B) their research does not contravene generic international and national laws, and 
institutional codes of ethical principles and practices, working conditions and 
regulations, in relation to financial control and audit, personnel management, the 
anonymisation, collection, disclosure, disposal, protection, and storage of sensitive 
and personal data, the maintenance of workplace health and safety, the management 
of risk to research workers, participants and third parties, the registration of IPR, etc.; 
(C) persons employed for research are appointed, via an open, well documented and 
transparent selection process, solely on the basis of their research excellence, 
expertise and experience and are not subject to discrimination on the basis of the 
factors identified above; 
(D) notwithstanding point (C) above, where required by national or state legislation, 
academic staff may exercise affirmative action to secure employment for groups 
under-represented in research positions in universities, but this must be undertaken 
strictly in adherence with the relevant legislation and recorded as such. Such 
temporary measures must discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment are achieved. 
(E) where research is undertaken by using financial and other resources from an external 
agency (either private or public), the requirements and conditions of any sponsoring 
agency must be clearly established and expressed in a mutually agreed contract or 
equivalent document. More particularly, there must be no undeclared conflict of 
interest (academic, financial or personal in nature) in the proposed research and the 
relative rights of the research sponsors and researchers over research outputs 
(respecting the ownership, publication and subsequent use and exploitation of 
research data) must be made clear. Progress on sponsored research must be provided 
accurately and regularly, and any deviations to the contract (e.g., delay, early 
completion or termination, re-definition,  etc.), and the reasons for them reported 
fully. 
(F) national and institutional systems of quality assurance exist to ensure that all research 
applications are scrutinised and have prior ethical approval, and to investigate 
complaints and expressions of concern about breaches of ethical procedures, 
whereby such breaches can be investigated and appropriate actions taken. 
(2) With whom and for what purpose they pursue their research. No member of a university 
may be required to participate in academic or artistic work which conflicts with his/her 
conscience.  
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(3) The methods and avenues by which they disseminate, make accessible, exploit and 
commercialise the findings of their research. In exercising this freedom, staff must ensure 
that, as agreed by their academic peers and relevant academic associations and 
professional bodies, their research outputs: 
(A) accurately and honestly report the full results of their research and are not subject to 
plagiarism, forgery, misleading manipulation or partial reporting of research data and 
results; 
(B) acknowledge fully and fairly the relative direct and indirect contributions of co- and 
joint authors, academic colleagues and other people and organisations (including 
sponsors) involved in the research; 
(C) do not compromise the anonymity of research participants, co-researchers and 
sponsoring bodies, breach personal or institutional confidentiality, or infringe 
intellectual property rights agreements. 
Few in European academia would gainsay the previous statements, variations of which 
appear within national and institutional pronouncements on academic freedom and to which, 
Arblaster maintains, ‘[e]very vice-chancellor, college principal and education minister pays 
verbal tribute’ (Arblaster, 1974, 10). However, such declarations constitute just the bare bones 
of academic freedom. The vital flesh that covers them, and gives operational sustenance to the 
concept in both the intellectual spirit and the day to day minutiae of university life, lies in the 
norms and procedures of shared governance and tenured employment which are, as Gerber 
maintains, ‘the two principal institutional bulwarks for academic freedom’ (Gerber, 2001, 22).  
Previous research by Karran (2007) into the laws on academic tenure revealed variations 
between the different EU states, but showed, categorically that some form of tenure 
(sometimes via competition and/or with a limited term) is the norm rather than the exception.  
Hence, for a working, rather than merely postulatory, definition of academic freedom for the 
European states, these must be addressed. 
Self Governance 
To guarantee academic freedom, academic staff must: 
(1) Have the right to voice opinions on the educational policies and priorities within their 
institutions without the imposition or threat of punitive action, and fulfill their collegial 
obligations in a professional manner. In exercising this freedom, staff must ensure that: 
(A) all staff have an equal right to speak and their opinions and beliefs are accorded due 
respect; 
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(B) all personal, departmental and institutional professional commitments are fulfilled in 
a timely and professional manner. 
(2) Have the determinant voice and prominent role in decision making processes. How this is 
achieved will differ with national and institutional variations in the decision making 
structures of universities. In universities where the Senate, comprising the academic 
teaching staff, is the sole deliberative and executive body, decisions will, perforce, 
require the support of the majority of academic staff. In universities in which the Senate 
also includes representatives of students, and research and nonacademic staff, or in which 
executive powers are shared between the Senate and one or more internal or external 
bodies, protocols must exist ensuring that the voices of the academic staff are primus 
inter pares, and guarding against filibustering, policy gridlock and professorial oligarchy. 
For example, by giving 60 out of 100 Senate seats to academic staff, but applying a 
threshold of 70 votes for an ordinance to be enacted, the academic staff have the major 
say in decision making, but cannot ignore the opinions of other participating groups. 
Where policies are determined following due democratic process, staff are professionally 
obligated to assist in their implementation, even though personally they may disagree 
with the policies. 
(3) Be able to appoint, from amongst their number, people into positions of managerial 
authority, and hold them to periodic account by agreed democratic processes. However, 
in exercising these powers academic staff: 
(A) where required by national or state legislation, or institutional guidelines, may 
exercise affirmative action to secure entry to managerial positions from groups 
under-represented in such positions in universities, but this must be undertaken 
strictly in adherence with the relevant legislation and guidance and recorded as such. 
Such temporary measures must be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment are achieved. 
(B) should ensure that the burden of administration does not repeatedly fall on the same 
individual(s) and/or departments, by limiting the number of consecutive terms an 
individual can spend in a particular post, and rotating the posts between departments. 
(4) Be able to determine who shall serve as Rector. Where possible the Rector should be 
appointed from within the University by democratic process with the support of the 
majority of academic staff, and subjected to the same democratic process if additional 
terms of office are sought by an incumbent Rector. There should be a limit to the number 
of consecutive terms an individual can serve. Where the appointment is external (owing 
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to a dearth of suitable internal candidates, or because of national or state legislation), the 
academic staff should have the major role in determining the appointment. The form of 
this role will vary between institutions and countries but could include determining the 
short list of candidates, voting to choose one from a shortlist of candidates drawn up 
externally, having the right of veto of an externally selected candidate. As with other 
governance procedures, the aim is to encourage active participation whilst preventing 
professorial obstinacy and capriciousness.  
Tenure 
Tenure is granted to academics so that they can undertake their teaching and research 
duties to the highest levels of professional competence. Tenure gives academics the freedom 
to undertake research which questions accepted knowledge, via avant-garde ideas and 
controversial theories, which are then tested in the crucible of expert critical debate with 
students and staff, without fear of reprisal. The corollary of this is that those academics who 
cease to perform their duties in an active, competent and professional manner neither need, 
nor merit, the protection of tenure. Defining adequate cause for dismissal is, therefore, as 
necessary an element of academic freedom as the granting of tenure. 
Hence, to guarantee and protect the integrity of academic freedom, contractual 
arrangements must exist ensuring that only academic staff with the requisite high level of 
competence in research and teaching are given protection from the fear of dismissal for the 
views they express; and enable action to be taken, through due process, to remove tenure from 
staff who fail to meet minimum levels of competence or professional standards of conduct in 
these areas, or for whom, because of bona fide circumstances (programme viability and 
institutional financial exigency), the university is unable to continue to offer employment. 
These processes are different in nature. In the first it is incumbent upon the probationer to 
demonstrate competence, in the second it is incumbent on the institution to demonstrate due 
cause. However, the process whereby tenure is removed should be as stringent and rigorous as 
that whereby it is awarded. To uphold the integrity of academic freedom, faculty members 
must just as willing and empowered to recommend the revocation of tenure and the dismissal 
of a faculty member for just cause, as they are to recommend the granting of tenure for staff 
that meet the necessarily high probationary standards. How these processes operate will differ 
in accordance with national, federal and state variations in generic employment law and the 
contractual arrangements and obligations of individual higher education institutions. At the 
very least any system should ensure that: 
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(1) The terms and conditions of every appointment are supplied, in writing, to each staff 
member on appointment (as are any subsequent revisions to that appointment). Any 
limitations on academic freedom resulting from the distinct nature of the institution (e.g. 
if it has specific religious beliefs), should be clearly stated. Additionally, a full 
explanation of the procedures for the approval and revocation of tenure should be clearly 
documented. 
(2) There is a statutory probationary period of employment: 
(A) During which staff have the full protection of academic freedom enjoyed by all other 
academic staff. 
(B) Which is of finite length (typically between five to seven years and which may be 
served at more than one institution), sufficient to enable assessment of the 
candidates’ professional expertise and commitment. 
(C) During which the peer review process has the ability to exclude all those who 
demonstrably cannot meet the requisite professional standards in respect to their 
teaching and research responsibilities. 
(D) At an agreed date before the end of which, probationary staff should be subjected to 
an agreed peer review procedure, (see (4) below) which determines whether they are 
offered continued employment in a tenured position, or whether their employment 
ceases at the end of the probationary period, and probationers should be informed of 
the outcome in writing and may request the reasons which contributed to the 
decision. 
(3) Prior to the start of the probationary period, the procedures of the tenure process are 
clearly stated in writing, including a full explanation of, e.g., minimum requirements in 
terms of the provision of lectures and tutorials and the production of published research 
outputs, details of the internal system of peer review, etc. The relative weights applied to 
these activities must be made known to the candidate at the start of the probationary 
period. 
(4) There is a rigorous peer review system for assessing whether staff are granted tenure at 
the end of their probationary period and as a part of which: 
(A) staff provide a portfolio describing their work during their probationary period. Such 
a portfolio is likely to include information on the following: 
(i) Teaching: lectures and seminars (at undergraduate and postgraduate levels), and, 
if appropriate, peer and student evaluations of teaching competence; 
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(ii) Research activities including successful grant applications, published outputs 
(whether in print, accepted for publication or submitted for publication), creative 
artefacts, other scholarly efforts and PhD supervision; 
(iii) Pastoral care and other services for students; 
(iv) Managerial and administrative duties and service on committees, within the 
university; 
(v) Public service for the community at local, state or national level; 
(vi) Other evidence of scholarly merit or academic recognition, such as fellowships, 
honors, and election to office in scholarly or professional organisations. 
(vii) The names of possible external reviewers, of a rank higher than the candidate, 
and able to make informed judgements as to the candidate’s academic merit. 
(B) The candidate’s Head of Department, after consultation by an agreed process with 
colleagues of a rank higher than the candidate, submits the names of external 
evaluators able to make informed judgements as to the candidate’s academic merit. 
(C) An institutional Tenure Review Committee is established which 
(i) comprises members, none of whom are known, personally or academically to the 
candidate, of a rank higher than the candidate, chosen by democratic selection 
from among the Faculty on the basis of their objectivity and competence, to 
serve for a set period, and which elects its own Chair.. 
(ii) reviews the submissions from the candidate and the Departmental Head and 
selects from them an agreed number of external reviewers, from whom it solicits 
an appraisal of the candidate’s merit, based on a critical review of the 
candidate’s portfolio of achievement. Evaluators may also be asked to comment 
on other aspects of the candidate’s case of which they may have specific 
familiarity, such as papers heard delivered at conferences. Institutional 
guidelines about the nature of the review process must be provided to reviewers 
who must judge the candidate purely on the basis of competence, rather than any 
substantive viewpoints the candidate may have expressed, and without reference 
to any other of the candidate’s attributes which are deemed irrelevant. To 
encourage objective and unequivocal evaluations, the external reviewers must be 
assured that their statements will be confidential. 
(iii) deliberates in camera to consider, by an agreed process of free debate, the 
evaluation of the candidate’s merit as expressed by the external reviewers, and 
makes a recommendation as to whether the candidate should be offered tenure. 
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(5) There is a rigorous system of assessing whether tenure should be terminated because of 
lack of programme viability, as a part of which 
(A) An institutional Committee is established which 
(i) comprises members, none of whom are known, personally or academically to the 
affected staff, chosen by democratic selection from among the Faculty on the 
basis of their objectivity and competence, to serve for a set period, but which 
does not include staff whose jobs are at risk through the termination of the 
programme, and which elects its own Chair.  
(ii) reviews the decision to formally cease a program of instruction, ensuring that 
such a decision is based on a comprehensive appraisal of the likely long term 
impact on the institution of continuing or discontinuing with the programme. 
(iii) recommends either continuing or discontinuing the relevant programme. 
(vi) hears appeals from affected staff against their relocation to comparable posts 
and/or job termination following a decision to discontinue a programme. 
(B) Every effort is made by the institution to provide affected staff with comparable 
employment elsewhere in the institution, including the provision of additional re-
training. 
(C) Where a tenured post is removed, it should not be filled within agreed period of time, 
without first offering it to the previous post-holder. The tenured employment of a 
faculty member will not be terminated in favor of retaining a faculty member without 
tenure, except in extraordinary circumstances, the reasons for which must be well-
documented. 
(6) There is a rigorous system of assessing whether tenure shall be terminated because of 
institutional financial exigency as a part of which: 
(A) An institutional Committee is established which: 
(i) is composed of members, none of whom are known, personally or academically 
to the affected staff, chosen by democratic selection from among the Faculty on 
the basis of their objectivity and competence, to serve for a set period, but which 
does not include staff whose jobs are at risk through institutional financial 
exigency, and which elects its own Chair.  
(ii) establishes whether a situation of bon fide financial exigency exists, or is likely 
to exist, of such a magnitude (for example, inability to meet operating expenses) 
that it constitutes a threat to the continued survival of the institution and cannot 
be remedied by any other means. 
p.18 
(ii) determines what actions need to be taken to alleviate the situation. 
(iii) sets the criteria for identifying the staff whose tenure shall be removed, and 
applies them. 
(vi) ensures that all possible alternatives to the termination of tenure among the staff 
thus identified (such as transfers and re-training) have been exhausted. 
(B) Where a tenured post is removed, it shall not be filled within agreed period of time, 
without first offering it to the previous post-holder. 
(7) There is a rigorous system of assessing whether tenure shall be revoked and employment 
terminated because of just cause (that is, for reasons other than lack of programme 
viability or institutional financial exigency). At the very least any system should ensure 
that 
(A) A full written explanation of the grounds and procedures for the revocation of tenure 
is supplied to each staff member on appointment. The grounds that are deemed valid 
may vary between different nations and universities, in accordance with the differing 
degrees of importance that are attached (through individual institutional customs and 
practices) to the various elements of the academic role. However, these are likely to 
include unlawful activities (e.g. theft of funds or property), abuse of the constituent 
elements of academic freedom identified above, repeated and systematic failure to 
fulfill academic duties (e.g. in the areas of teaching and research) to the minimum 
standards required to merit the protection of academic freedom afforded by the 
original granting of tenure, and of the following violations of institutional and 
professional norms (as identified by Braxton and Bayer 1999, 21-38): 
(i) Moral Turpitude - depraved, unprincipled acts by faculty members (e.g. sexual 
relationships with a student, making suggestive sexual comments to a student, 
intoxication by dint of consumption of alcohol or drugs). 
(ii) Particularistic Grading - the uneven or preferential treatment of students in the 
determining of grades (e.g. differential application of policies about late 
submission of assessments). 
(iii) Condescending Negativism - the treatment of both colleagues and students in a 
condescending and demeaning way (e.g. criticising a colleague’s work in front 
of students). 
(iv) Inattentive Planning - a lack of attention to the planning of a course (e.g. failing 
to provide a syllabus for students before commencing a course). 
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(v) Personal Disregard - failure to address the needs and sensitivities of students as 
individuals (e.g. habitually arriving late to classes and finishing them early). 
(vi) Uncommunicated Course Details - failure to inform students of important 
particulars about a course (e.g. changes in class and examination times and 
locations without due notice). 
(vii) Uncooperative Cynicism – inveterate refusal to participate actively in 
legitimately assigned departmental duties as part of the role of university 
teaching (e.g. persistent absence from departmental management meetings, 
contemptuous neglect of teaching duties). 
Procedural standards for the conduct of tenure revocation and staff dismissal 
hearings may vary in accordance with national employment law and institutional 
statutes, but are likely to include the appellant’s right 
(i) not to request a hearing, provided that the appropriate bodies are informed in 
writing, within a specified period prior to the hearing. 
(ii) for sufficient time to prepare a defence. 
(iii) to request that the hearing is held in private, not in public. 
(iv) to appoint an external advocate to assist in the preparation and presentation of 
written and oral defence evidence. 
(v) of access to all institutional documents, relevant to the case. 
(vi) to call witnesses (from within the university and from other universities) to 
attend the hearing and give evidence, on the appellant’s behalf. 
(vii) to question, either in person or via an external advocate, all witnesses at the 
hearing who testify orally. 
(viii) to address, either in person or via an external advocate, all written evidence 
considered at the hearing, including witness statements. 
(B) An institutional Tenure Review Committee (either a Standing Committee, or one 
especially convened) is established:  
(i) which is composed of members, none of whom are known, personally or 
academically to the appellant, chosen by democratic selection from among the 
Faculty on the basis of their objectivity and competence, to serve for a set 
period, and which elects its own Chair.  
(ii) which undertakes a confidential, informal assessment as to whether there are 
reasonable grounds to question the fitness of a faculty member who has tenure or 
whose period of appointment has not expired, and establishes whether formal 
p.20 
proceedings to consider revocation of tenure and subsequent dismissal should be 
initiated. 
(iii) which determines whether formal proceedings are warranted. If they are, the 
committee should: 
(a) issue a formal written statement to the person concerned, specifying the 
grounds for the revocation of tenure to be considered at an evidential 
hearing; 
(b) indicate the date, time and location of the evidential hearing, undertaken by 
the relevant university committee, to determine the veracity of the grounds 
for the revocation of tenure; 
(c) request a written response, within a specified time period, indicating 
whether the appellant wishes the hearing to go ahead, and if so, petition a 
written response in rebuttal of the stated grounds; 
(d) clarify and inform the appellant of his/her procedural rights; 
(e) assign an appropriately qualified administrator to gather and present 
supportive evidence for the grounds of tenure revocation. 
(iv) that meets at the due date and deliberates upon the statement of grounds for 
dismissal and the written rebuttal provided by the appellant. If the appellant has 
determined not to have a hearing, and has therefore provided no rebuttal, the 
Committee should adjudicate on the basis of the available evidence, and 
determine whether tenure should be revoked. If the appellant opts to have a 
hearing, it is the duty of the Committee to: 
(a) examine the grounds for tenure revocation and the appellant’s rebuttal. 
(b) assess the veracity of these statements, by reference to written evidence and 
via the questioning of witnesses by the Committee, the appellant or his 
advocate, and the administrator appointed to gather supportive evidence for 
tenure revocation. 
(c) hear oral arguments advanced by the appellant or his advocate, and the 
administrator appointed to gather supportive evidence for tenure revocation. 
(d) provide definitive verdicts, stating whether each of the grounds cited for the 
revocation of tenure is upheld or denied; 
(e) issue a conclusive report, on the basis of the verdicts reached, to either 
revoke or retain tenure for the appellant. 
(8) There is an Appeals System under whichxxx 
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(A) unsuccessful candidates can appeal against: 
(i) tenure denial on the grounds of negligent process or inadequate consideration; 
(ii) tenure revocation on the grounds of programme non-viability: 
(iii) tenure revocation on the grounds of institutional financial exigency: 
(iv) tenure revocation on the grounds of just cause, for reasons other than programme 
non-viability or institutional financial exigency. 
(B) an Appeals Committee is established, composed of members, chosen on the basis of 
their objectivity and competence by a process of democratic selection from among 
the Faculty, to serve for a set period and which elects its own Chair. None of 
committee must be known, personally or academically to the appellant, and in the 
cases examining tenure denial decisions, they must be of a rank higher than the 
appellant. In the case of tenure revocation for just cause, the Appeals Committee will 
be drawn from the University’s Governing Body. 
(C) the Appeals Committee assesses, in camera, whether the Tenure Review Committee 
followed due processes, in line with national or state legislation and the relevant 
statutes and standards of the institution, when: 
(i) evaluating a candidate’s case for tenure approval,. The Appeals Committee 
cannot reverse a tenure denial decision, but may request reconsideration by the 
Tenure Review Committee, indicating the areas in which it believes the process 
was negligent or the consideration inadequate. 
(ii) evaluating the case for tenure revocation on the grounds of programme non-
viability. The Committee may request reconsideration of the grounds for 
programme non-viability and hear appeals from affected staff against their 
relocation to comparable posts and/or job termination following a decision to 
discontinue a programme. 
(iii) evaluating the case for tenure revocation on the grounds of financial exigency. 
The Committee may request reassessment as to whether a state of financial 
exigency exists, or of the criteria used to identify staff at risk, or of the 
application of those criteria. 
(iv) evaluating the case for tenure revocation on the grounds of just cause. The 
Committee may request reconsideration, indicating the respects in which it 
believes the process was negligent, the consideration inadequate, or the outcome 
unjust in the light of new evidence. 
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(C) the Appeals Committee provides copies of its deliberations, indicating the reasons 
for either upholding or denying the appeal, to the appellants, the designated 
university administrative officer and the Tenure Review Committee which, if 
requested, will be re-constituted to examine new evidence, ameliorate assumed 
negligent or inadequate practice in its deliberations, and produce a report of its 
deliberations for consideration by the Appeals Committee. The decision of the 
Appeals Committee is final. 
(D) if the Appeals Committee requests reconsideration by the Tenure Review 
Committee, it assesses the report arising from the reconsideration, and makes a final 
decision, indicating the reasons for either upholding or denying the appeal, to the 
appellants, the designated university administrative officer and the Tenure Review 
Committee. 
Conclusion and Next Steps 
This paper’s major rationale was to answer the criticisms of Barnett (1990, 137) and others, 
by moving beyond the usual formulaic approaches which suggest that academic freedom is 
important but is so finely nuanced, historically specific, etc. that definitions are not only 
impossible, but should not even be attempted. Additionally, there was a desire to respond to a 
long standing call for an authoritative canon stipulating not only the rights of academic 
freedom but also its limitations, thereby providing a practical modus vivendi for the concept 
within today’s studia generalia. Nearly forty years ago Lord Ashby, then Cambridge’s Vice 
Chancellor, echoing Humboldt’s principles, described the distinctive feature of a university as 
‘the essential relevance of research to teaching’, but lamented that the academic profession 
had no declared ethical code and therefore called for a Hippocratic Oath for higher education 
which could ‘stabilise . . . a schizophrenic and disintegrating profession and … provide a 
basis of leadership, authority and example to students’ (Ashby, 1969, pp 64, 66) which idea 
has recently been given greater clarity and support by Watson (2007). Similarly, Thorens 
(2000, 281) has argued that ‘academic freedom and university autonomy are necessary, that a 
universal charter on them is also necessary. Indeed, all previous documents - some of great 
value - which have been written in the last few decades are either local or regional, as far as 
their origin goes. Or they concern one type of institution. Or again, they are very general and 
mix up academic freedom and other concepts. A universal charter is therefore desirable’. 
Following from Thorens’ exhortation, the European Union already has a Magna Charta 
Universitatum, establishing a Magna Charta Libertatis Academicae, constitutes a desirable 
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next step. Such a document would protect the professional rights of staff, and raise vocational 
standards, whilst providing enhanced protection for students from abuses of academic 
freedom.  
To take this work forward, requires that this preliminary definition, like all academic 
research that attempts to advance knowledge, is tempered and tested within the crucible of 
informed and rigorous academic debate. Most of the elements of this working definition are 
derived from, and relate to, common strands of national legislation on academic freedom 
within the EU states, however, questions that could usefully be addressed include the 
following. To what extent, and in what ways, does this definition contradict the constitutions 
and laws of the European Union and its constituent states? To what extent does it infringe the 
academic freedom of students? What support would there be within the academic staff of 
Europe’s universities to implement such a definition? How similar/different is it from national 
legislation on employment protection? Would implementing such a definition lead to a 
reduction in academic freedom in some states? Would implementing such a definition 
strengthen the European Higher Education Learning Space? How readily could such a 
definition be incorporated into the European Revision Treaty, or an academic Bill of Rights? 
More importantly, would it be necessary to have a supra-national authority to which appeals 
could be made to ensure that the requirements of any such Magna Charta are upheld? 
Further work on refining the concept of academic freedom is both timely and necessary. 
For example, following Barnett’s suggestion, ‘a theory of academic freedom which does 
justice to the actual relationship between higher education and society rather than an 
imaginary relationship’ (Barnett, 1988, 90), would do much to strengthen and protect the 
concept. Similarly, little empirical work has been undertaken on how academic staff 
understand, experience, and make use of their academic freedom in European universities, or 
whether and what types of academic freedoms could (and should) be afforded to students. 
More important than this, however, is a recognition by academics that the protection of 
academic freedom is something in which they should become actively involved. There is a 
tendency, given both the ever growing pressures to teach more students and write more 
articles, for university staff to ignore the process whereby, via legislation or legerdemain, 
academic freedom is being slowly but irrevocably eroded. Academic freedom brings rights 
and responsibilities - a major one of which is ensuring that such rights are there to be used and 
enjoyed by future generations of scholars. Society at large will only sanction the granting of 
particular freedoms to a specific professional group, if it is persuaded that these freedoms 
produce net benefits. Hence it is incumbent on today’s academics to voice, with passion and 
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persuasion, the reasons for the continuance of academic freedom. Neglecting such a 
responsibility will surely impoverish academics, academia, and the free society in which they 
operate. 
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